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The welfare state represents one of the major integrative arrangements of modern
democracies. It has an important impact on the redistribution of wealth and the structure of
inequality. In some respects, the welfare state helped to heal social divisions or at least to
mitigate social inequalities; not only in terms of material inequalities, but also in
ideological and political terms. Although essential for the idea of the welfare state the
society-wide support for such redistributive efforts cannot be taken for granted. Older
collectivist thinkers of welfare were less concerned with these kind of problems. Marshall
(1965, p. 97), for example, saw a “growing measure of agreement on fundamentals” with
regard to the provision of services and the willingness of the citizens to contribute. Many
of those on the Left but also New Liberals had a great faith in human public-spiritedness
and the mobilisation of altruistic motivations. In the Beveridge plan one can find an
expression of the self-esteem of that time: “The capacity and desire of the British people to
contribute for security are among the most certain and impressive social facts” (Cmnd
6404, 1942, p. 119).
Since the comfortable mixture of economic growth and welfare state expansion has
come to an end the welfare state has been subjected to a crisis discussion. Its integrative
capacity and its ability to compromise different class interests have been doubted. It was
assumed that pro-welfare-state orientations thrive under conditions of a prospering welfare
state, whereas they “tend to decompose under zero-sum conditions” (Offe 1987, p. 530).
Many commentators saw the end of the ‘welfare consensus’ and the rise of individualist
and anti-collectivist ideologies which would turn against social protection and state
intervention. It was assumed that the higher status groups will express their anti-welfare
sentiments within the political arena, whereas the welfare beneficiaries of the lower status
sections of the society might be the defenders of the welfare state. In this regard, it was
widely assumed that people will support social institutions if they derive benefits from
them. The “beneficial involvement” of social groups was seen as the crucial factor for the
public standing of the welfare institutions. Special attention was given to the middleclasses: “The idea here is that if the middle classes benefit from programmes, then they
will not use their not inconsiderable political skills to obtain more resources for those
programmes or to defend them in periods of decline” (Goodin/LeGrand 1987, p. 210).
This paper sets out a comparative frame which charts the attitudinal stances towards the
welfare state in Great Britain and Germany with a special focus on group differences.
Following the argument made before, the institutional architecture is viewed as a decisive
component which conditions the self-interest motives of the population. But moreover, it
carries ideological and ideational notions which influence likewise the orientations of the
general public. The institutionalised values and norms must appeal to the sense of justice
and adequacy of a large number of citizens. The social security institutions depend on a
‘normative soundness’ which gives reason to participate and to contribute beyond pure
self-interest, because of the “burden of discomfort which is a necessary part of any policy”
(Ringen 1987, p. 50).
Liberal and conservative welfare regimes
The use of welfare state typologies has become a common analytical tool for
comparative purposes. For the comparison of the United Kingdom and Germany one might
draw on Titmuss (1974) “models of social policy” and Esping-Andersens (1990) “worlds
of welfare capitalism”. Within Titmuss’ frame, the UK represents the “residual welfare
model” with a limited function of state welfare, whereas Germany can be characterised as
an “industrial achievement model” where the policy is constructed in close relationship
with the employment status. Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes cluster the different
models in a similar vein. By taking up and fleshing out the Marschallian (1963)
proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of the welfare state Esping-
Anderson looks at the way in which social rights and entitlements are granted. Central for
the distinction of different models is the level of de-commodification
1 of labour within
state welfare, i.e. how independent from the market position of individuals does the social
safety net provides social security and benefits.
The German conservative welfare model is distinguished by group politics,
communitarian economics and mutualist social policies (Goodin et al. 1999, p. 51). Born
out of authoritarian and paternalist strategies of modernisation, the German welfare state
is organised around the unifying theme of social cohesion and social integration. Since its
inauguration at the end of the 19
th century, the welfare state remained firmly based on
corporate social insurance organisations, contributory schemes and a compulsory
character of the insurances. Their institutional design preserves social and economic
differentials. The ‘industrial achievement model’ is in Titmuss (1974, p. 31) words one
1 For reasons of measurement Esping-Andersen (1990) introduces a de-commodification score capturing old-
age pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance, their replacement rates and requirement
qualifications.where “social needs should be met on the basis of merit, work performance and
productivity.” Hence, social protection is not confined to those who are presently in
distress, as in the liberal ideal, but moreover it covers those groups which are considered
to be the productive resources of the industrial society. The main pillar of the German
welfare state are social insurances which are closely related to the labour market
2.T h e i r
organisational form links benefits to prior earnings in order to maintain the relative status
of the beneficiary. The principle of equivalence is status preserving and puts emphasis on
upholding status differences. The redistributive impact of the German welfare model is
therefor limited. It promotes a concept of ‘individual equity’ on the bases of status
maintenance and equivalence, supplemented by supporting programs for particular
groups such as housing benefit and means-tested social assistance (see Clasen 1997). The
social bias of the conservative model can be found in the privileged treatment of families
and its organisation around a bread-winner ideal
3 (Sainsbury 1996).
Although not an archetypical example of the liberal cluster the British welfare system is
clearly marked by a liberal legacy and owes most of its institutional assets to Beveridges
comprehensive plan for social insurance and allied services. It is characterised by
residualist social policies on a modest level aiming at subsistence rather than redistribution
or status maintenance. Because there is a substantive acceptance of the supremacy of the
market logic, the liberal notion of social policy centres around market relations, choice and
free exchange. Liberals value a type of ‘productive social welfare’ safeguarding the market
performance and giving priority to high disposable incomes and low taxation rates. In a
liberal welfare regime benefits will typically be targeted to those genuinely in need of
them. Income support and social services will be given only to groups with a demonstrable
lack of income resources. Social security takes the form of “limited substitution”
(Clarke/Langan 1993b, p.25) with as less interference with the market mechanisms as
possible. A comparably great amount of the system is financed out of general taxation
(social assistance and health), whereas insurance contributions have less importance than,
for example, in the German system. Some principles of the British welfare state justify the
claim that Britains welfare state has a “more egalitarian ethos” (Ginsburg 1992, p. 139)
than the conservative system. In contrast to the Bismarckian tradition, “which relates
proportionally each wage-earner’s rights to the contribution that he or she has paid or that
the employer made on her behalf” (Chassard/Quentin 1992, p. 94), the Beveridgean
concept gave a central role to uniform entitlements for the prevention of poverty in case of
old age, unemployment and poverty.
2 Offe (1991) examines the employment-centered nature of the German security system. According to him,
the system establishes a premium for all those who “lead an ordinary and orderly work life by ‘earning’ a full
(and preferably uninterrupted) record” (p. 126) That is what he called the ‘hidden curriculum’ of the social
security system.
3 In a number of programmatic elements of the German welfare system dependants can acquire entitlements
through the breadwinners contribution.Institutional design and social integration
This systematisation of welfare regimes is very telling for the political and moral
economy of the welfare state. It does not only address the institutional features which
generate rational support for the welfare state, it also includes the normative and ideational
connotations of the institutions. From this perspective, one can derive some insights of
how the welfare regimes ensure their popular acceptance, and how the interests of different
groups are integrated and tied together. Offe (1991, p. 129) has argued that the German
social security system is morally undemanding
4 in its stated objective of security, because
“no one needs to believe in lofty principles of solidarity, justice, or equality to become –
and remain – a rational supporter of the system (...) Its modest goal is the guarantee of
income – and of relative income status! – for employees and their dependants. As a
consequence, rational self interest on the part of the ‘internal constituency’ of the insured is
sufficient as a base for consent.” The set of principles which is incorporated into the
German system, especially the role of insurances which establish property-like
relationships between the fund contributions and the benefit-entitlements, has promoted a
self-immunisation of the system. Those who finance the social insurance are likely to profit
from it. The system and the principles which it inhibits give little indication for a
‘misdirection’ of resources to non-contributors. As long as redistribution remains
horizontal, that means within ‘insurance communities’ with a common exposure to a
certain risk, ‘rational opposition’ is unlikely to emerge. Cost saving measures have echoed
the insurance rationale by targeting the cuts towards the redistributive ‘insurance alien’
rather than to the ‘genuine’ beneficiaries (see Clasen 1997, p. 78).
Nonetheless, the German welfare state was not only able to generate consent on the
bases of status differentials, it also achieved a kind of “differentiated integration” of the
society (Leisering 1996). This ‘differentiated integration’ refrains from egalitarian
principles and gives even higher status groups attractive benefits packages on the bases of
their contributory records. In contrast to the British system, it was said that the middle
classes and people in relatively secure full-time employment in Germany form a
principally supportive section of the population, especially in the case of pensions. They
have, as Clasen (1997, p. 80) writes, their “stake in the system” and they are less
encouraged to take up private provision. Therefor, skilled workers, white-collar employees
and civil servants have appeared as strong defenders of the core welfare institutions (see
Alber 1986, p. 123ff.). With regard to the liberal model, it was argued that the “middle
class legitimacy” is the distinctive feature of the German ‘social security state’ (Leibfried
1989).
4 It is interesting to note that this morally undemanding institutional architecture has always been criticised
by the Left. According to their view, the robust institutional structure built on the individual utility maximiser
rather than the altruistic and compassionate individual has failed to live up to the promise of social justice,
universality and a non-discriminating concept of social rights. Not only that the system has been accused of
being incapacitating in terms of effective social protection, it was also assumed that it undermines forms of
solidarity. The rational sources of support, to which the system appeals, represented a productivist approach
to welfare provision, and excludes a legitimate agenda for redistributive issues (see also Offe 1991).Although equivalence and compensatory principles have a dominant position in the
system, there are also apparent redistributive efforts. Clasen (1997, p. 80) has noted that
the mix of principles which the social insurances incorporate makes income redistribution
easier to legitimise; different values can be stressed and applied. The redistributive
elements of the pension insurance is given by the fact that although the pension
entitlements are based on individual records, the benefits are by no means a kind of
restitution of foregone contributions (saving or investment model). Because they are
financed on the basis of current contributions to the social insurance fund, huge amounts of
transfers are directed from the employed labour force to the retired. To these solidarity
motives it is commonly referred as ‘generation solidarity’ or ‘generation contract’. That the
level of pensions is coupled with the actual level of market incomes ensures an
apportionment of the increasing national wealth in which the pensioners participate. The
concept of fairness which is represented in the pension system is rather a general one of
‘past productivity’ – even though the entitlement rules are strict - than one of direct
congruence between contributions and benefits
5. Pensions form with around 40 per cent
the largest of social expenditure.
But despite this integrative capacity the social security design is open to destabilisation
coming from a lack of compliance. For example, it has been emphasised that the social
security system appears to be vulnerable to labour market imbalances; in first instance,
because the labour market determines the size of contributions and the size of the
beneficiaries, and in secondly, because the social security system determines the market
strategies of the labour market participants (see Offe 1991, p. 130/131). This vulnerability
extends to the socio-political effects of an imbalanced labour market with sharp divisions
between the active insiders and the inactive outsiders. The system operates in a way that
instead of communalising the social risk of unemployment, people tend to perceive the
biased and groups-specific effects of redistribution. The risk community appears to be
divided into two fractions: the groups in regular employment which cover the costs of the
insurance funds, and the others outside the market who receive transfer income. In a
similar vein, Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 227) has highlighted the danger of an ‘insider-
outsider’ phenomenon within the German system: “To support housewives, male earners
must rely on high net take-home pay; to support the welfare-state clientele, the employed
will have to pay heavy taxes. And this is where the greatest potential for a conflict axis
appears. (...) When a shrinking active labour force is compelled to shoulder the costs of a
swelling human surplus, there is a likelihood of rising tax-resentment, especially since the
transfers are so clearly from the productive to the non-productive segment of the society.”
In addition, the German unification has posed enormous problems for the integrative
capacities of the German welfare state. Not only that the East Germans had to be integrated
into the social policy schemes, they had to do so through heavy transfers from the West to
5 Re-definitions of ‘active’ times, i.e. accountable times, are possible under the guiding principle of “reward
for achievement” as in the case of education, the bringing up of children or the inclusion of the East-German
pensioners into the system. These times are interpreted as on a par with employment no matter the actual
contributions, and therefore adhered to the moral impetus of the achieving society.the East. The welfare state was used as a vehicle to shoulder the high political and social
costs caused be a rapid and fundamental social change. For this task the old West German
welfare state was neither designed nor sufficiently prepared, and it managed only through
moving closer to its limits. Although the unification has seriously exacerbated and
deepened many of the problems which were already inherent in the system, the
government did not commission a re-examination of the institutional asset. Rather, it was
avoiding a general debate about the existing welfare model and its societal prerequisites;
none of the organisational principles of East German social services have been taken over
6.
This strategy created a two-tier welfare state “in which most easterners’ access to welfare
compares unfavourably with that of their western counterparts” (Mangen 1994, p. 42), but
also with the East on the drip of the West. In the face of serious budged deficits a
Solidarity Pact was introduced in 1993 as an attempt to restore the accommodation
between the main parties and the social partners “through seeking an agreement ostensibly
espousing the principles of solidarity and social justice" (Mangen 1994, p. 50). With this
pact, the scale of the East German transformation and the long-term responsibility was
finally acknowledged, even if not solved
7.
In contrast, the liberal-leaning welfare system of Britain is distinguished by a more
significant role of means-tested benefits, modest universal transfers and social insurance
benefits. It gains its political appeal from a confined role of the state to protect from
fundamental life risks and to ensure a national minimum. Many of the benefits have a
uniform or flat-rate character. Although social policy is meant to direct resources towards
the people living in poor and deprived conditions, redistribution is not a policy goal in
itself. The acceptance of such measures are generated by an ‘equality of opportunity’
vision and the societal obligation to enable people to care for themselves. Therefor,
assistance should be given only to those with insufficient resources who are unable to meet
their needs at the market. Essential is the underlying theme of ‘deserving’ and
‘undeserving’ poor that draws a distinction between those who can principally enter the
market relations and those who can not such as the old, disabled and the ill. In order to
encourage the market performance of those who are considered as able, the level of social
provision is placed underneath the attainable level of market earnings.
Glennerster (1995, p.221) has argued that the British system never won the support of
the middle classes because of its minimalist and flat-rate nature. Obviously, the importance
of poverty alleviation for liberal social engineering has left an institutional legacy that
focuses predominantly on the lower sections of the society rather than on comprehensive
status maintenance which might attract even higher status groups. Because of the
comparatively residual role of the National Insurance and its low income replacement
6 The East German tradition of a socialist and paternalistic social policy possessed some ‘citizenship’-
type welfare rights. It provided universal, but modest flat rate benefits, universal health services and child
services (Kindergardens).
7 In the absence of a successful economical animation of the new Länder and effective growth led-solutions,
the fiscal policy has introduced a tighter and more targeted approach towards social spending, especially in
the areas of active employment policy and further educationratio, many households
8 rely on social assistance and are subjected to a means-test in order
to proof eligibility. That is why the welfare state is largely identified with a social
minimum designed to protect from poverty and social hardship. Svallfors (1993, p. 114)
has shown that the “fate of the poor is more tightly wedded to other issues in the eyes of
the Britons” than in Germany for example.
These claiming principles and the benefit structures are crucial factors in shaping the
political surroundings of the social security programs. Since the reduction of the income
related supplement of the pensions and the transfer of many employees into the private
pension sector, the stake of the people in the state pension system has diminished. The
basic pension is not designed to satisfy the upper and the middle classes. For them,
occupational and private pensions have a great significance for the income maintenance in
old age. Politically, this shift creates a divided constituency; one part with a strong and
often entire reliance on a low level state pension, another part with additional private
provision.
The National Health Service represents one of the most impressive institutional
achievements of the British welfare state due to its universalist nature. It offers equal rights
of access to care and medical treatment and is financed out of general taxation. Thus, it
establishes an unconditional citizenship right for the entire population which is based on an
agreement that health care should not be treated like a market commodity. This principle
has demonstrated a profound social and political sustainability throughout the last decades.
For Britain it was suggested that the welfare state architecture might forward class
cleavages between different social groups because of the residual character of the welfare
policies (Esping-Andersen 1990, Taylor-Gooby 1991). The stratificatory effect of the
system is twofold with “a blend of relatively equality of poverty among state welfare
recipients, market differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism
between the two.” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 27). Because Britain lacks the strong link
between earnings status and benefit entitlements, the social insurance contributions are
perceived as another tax rather than as genuine insurance. That is the reason why the
ideology of ‘welfare burden’ took more easily root in Britain than in Germany (Wilson
1993, p. 148). And that explains why privatisation programs, the anti-dependency-rhetoric
and the attacks against excessive and wasteful state welfare could attracted the middle
classes. The low standards of social protection and the widened opportunities for exit from
direct state provision endangered the loyalty to the mass services (see Taylor-Gooby 1987,
p. 27) One of the diagnosed possible effects is the fragmentation of the welfare state into
two sectors; a heartland of services such as pensions and health, and a more rigid sector
including housing, unemployment, social work, and means-tested cash benefits with a
widespread “scepticism about value for money, and a preparedness to stigmatise
recipients.” (Parry 1986, p. 235)
8 More than one fifth of the population relied on means-tested benefits in 1994 (Evans 1998, p. 303)The logic of popular support: attitudinal patterns investigated
Equipped with this insight into the programmatic structures of the welfare models and
their possible implications for welfare state support some empirical evidence will be
scrutinised. Database for the is the International Social Survey Program
9 (ISSP 1996) with
the module ‘Role of Government’. For a better readability of the paper the survey data are
presented in the appendix (descriptive statistics and logistic regression models). They will
be used as references throughout the subsequent paragraph.
Overall it was found that there are remarkable differences in the level and the structure
of support for welfare issues. The citizenry of the United Kingdom appears to be in favour
of a more active role of the state. Due to the significantly lower level of welfare state
provision in Britain, and as reaction towards retrenchment policies during the 80s, this
result reflects an ongoing commitment of the vast majority of the population to the core
areas of welfare state activity. It has to be noted, that Britain has experienced a rigorous
attack on the welfare state during the Thatcher years. During this era benefits levels were
lowered, entitlement rules tightened and privatisation promoted. As a consequence, the
number of people depending of last-resort benefits has increased, and so has the level of
inequality. On this ground, people might be inclined to give preference to a stronger
engagement of the welfare state rather than to a further contraction of its role.
More then 70 percent support the statement that the state should spend more on social
services even if this means higher taxes
10. This finding contrasts a statement that could be
heard from Frank Field shortly before his appointment as Minister of Welfare Reform in
1997: “The British electorate wants high Continental benefit levels and low American
taxes. There is no way this dream can be met.” Rather, confronted with an either-or-choice,
the majority votes for social welfare. There is also some indication that the opinion has
moved in favour of expenditure since the Conservatives came into power (Parry 1986, p.
232). The group specificity on this issue indicates that there are no substantial divisions
between different income groups. Against the public polemic and even against common
intuition about the detachment of the well-off from the spirit of the welfare state the British
population appears to be rather unified on this general issue. The wider public gives credit
to the social services and disapproves further retrenchment of the existing schemes.
Accordingly, cuts in spending found a much lesser support amongst the British than
amongst the German citizenry.
Of course, the British are less inclined to support a welfare state that explicitly aims at
the redistribution of wealth. In line with the liberal legacy there is a significant section of
the society that disagrees on this issue. Moreover, redistribution is one of the most
9 For time comparisons the surveys from 1985 and 1990 will be used. The date have been supplied by the
Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) Köln. Because of the different political and social
traditions West-Germany and East-Germany will be treated as separate cases.
10 The income tax rate has been reduced significantly during the conservative era, while indirect consumption
taxes have been increased. The income tax rates, which were running from 30 per cent to 83 per cent were
changed to 25 to 40 per cent (Whalley 1990).contested policy principles of the British welfare state. The predominant ideological
underpinning of the welfare policies is committed to the supremacy of the commodity
logic and sees inequality as a function of free market relations. Paradigmatically, it is
assumed that the market allows the creation of wealth and disposable income that would
‘trickle down’ to the lower sections of the society. From this perspective, the “ethic of
equalisation” (Szirmai 1986, p. 103) hinders market productivity. Nonetheless, on this
issue the British society is highly divided along vertical status differences. Between the
highest income quartile and the lowest income quartile we find a significant attitudinal gap
that indicates clear class differences on a society wide theme.
In contrast to redistribution the survey data shows an impressive support for the state
responsibility for health. The general public demands strongly an increase of the health
budget. Some have viewed the NHS as an institutional asset to which the public mind is
deeply attached, while others have argued that the strong support the health system enjoys
derives simply from the fact that it is perceived as a ‘good buy’ (e.g. Glennerster 1995, p.
226). But the pay-off of a cheap health-care system are waiting lists, rationing policies and
outdated equipment, and the higher income groups might take up private health care to
meet their needs. Nonetheless, the public agreement on a free, tax-financed and universal
service is unchallenged. Interestingly, this commitment to the NHS and the demand for
more resources has a strong consensual bases with only marginal differences between
social groups. The higher social strata groups, for which private alternatives are available,
engage themselves for a better national system of health. Even the Conservative
government was withdrawing privatisation plans in the face of the overwhelming support
for the health service, and at the end of a long political process Thatcher demonstrated her
own commitment with the famous statement: “The NHS is safe with us.”
A strong majority of people likewise supports the state responsibility for people in old
age (71 per cent) and is in favour of more spending for old age pensions (78 per cent). In
the background of this response is the ‘residualisation of the national insurance’ in the
course of the 80s by which the earning-related pension supplements were thinned out. The
pensions promised and paid for were cut. Thus, the replacement ratio
11 of the state
pensions to the incomes of those in work has sharply declined. People were encouraged to
take up private schemes or occupational pensions in order to supplement the basic pension.
The structure of attitudes indicates a rather modest degree of differentiation. Although low
status groups or groups at risk such as the unemployed are more strongly in favour of
governmental responsibility and demand a better budget for the pension scheme, the same
tendency can be found amongst people with high incomes and the employees. This finding
does not reconfirm the many fears of a widening gap in social attitudes towards the state
pension which could be caused by the dual structure of the current pension provision. Even
groups for which the basic pension provides only a minor part of their pension portfolio
call for a stronger engagement of the welfare state.
11 In comparison, Britain spends significantly less on pensions than Germany and the income ofn pensioners
households in respect to the average household is lower than in other western welfare states.Compared to the impressive support for the health and the pension system, the
engagement for the unemployed is rather decent. The support for the modest and flat-rate
unemployment benefits falls far behind; it even has been weakened since the mid-80s. It is
known that the risk dispersion conditions the perception whether people see themselves as
prospective beneficiaries or not. In the case of pension and health, we have a relatively
even risk-distribution, whereas unemployment is a rather biased risk. Thus, the transfer of
resources between social groups is an obvious component of this benefit type. Hence, there
exist a strong stratificatory element; groups at risk like the unemployed or low income
groups are very much in favour of an increased spending while other groups show a lesser
concern
12. In addition to the self-interest structure, unemployment benefits were always
exposed to public scruples because it was thought that they undermine the self-help
capacities and the virtues of individual responsibility. In contrast to pensions and health,
the beneficiaries are conceived as ‘marketable’, and it is thought that too generous benefits
would weaken the incentives to take up work.
In sum, Britain appears as a society very much in favour of a greater state engagement
for the heartland services of the welfare state. High priority is given to benefits with a
relatively symmetric risk structure which do not feed any suspicion, and to measures with a
mainly horizontal or inter-temporal redistribution of resources. For this policy types we
find an overwhelming support throughout the society. About issues beyond this agenda,
exists a much more discriminating structure of political consent, which is “based on a
cruder self-interest diffused throughout the electorate and without any great pretension to
transfer between groups” (see Parry 1986, p. 233). Politically, the stances of public
opinion, to which the political leaders were sensitised, protected the elderly and the health
system, relative to other sections
13.
The West-German data indicate a lesser public support for governmental responsibility
in welfare provision (for comparisons also with Sweden and Italy see Taylor-Gooby 1998).
In the areas of health and old age pensions approximately half of the population
definitively wants governmental responsibility. There is only modest support for a ‘more’
in terms of expenditure and the bulk of people prefer that the governmental spending
should stay the same as it is. Health is perceived as the area most in need of additional
financial resources, as second comes the pension system.
However, it is interesting to note that the pensioners as actual beneficiaries are not the
most engaged supporters of a growing funding. These are the unemployed who might be
disadvantaged by a graduated and employment-record based entitlement model. Nearly
half of the retired population prefers a stable expenditure level and does not follow the path
12 This lesser concern as the predominant attitude exists despite the fact that unemployment is virtually the
only sector for which no private welfare market exists.
13 It was easier to realise cutbacks in the level and scope of unemployment benefit, than it was for the of
provision of health and pensions. Under the Conservative aegis the real value of unemployment benefit
dropped, but the value of the basic pension stayed much the same (Mulé 1999, p. 30). Similarly, against all
odds of privatisation and due to its public support the NHS remained largely intact. The government, so it
seems, implemented reforms where resistance was weakest and anti-welfare prejudices strongest.of ever-rising entitlement demands. The pension system seems to be satisfactory for many
of them. Although the pension system does generate substantive inequalities amongst the
elderly and gives a privileged status to people with a long employment biography, male
employees and civil servants, it is able to suffice in its maintenance objective for a
considerable proportion of the retired. It has been shown that the relative status obtained by
the recipient during his working life could be maintained and that the income situation
does not significantly worsen in old age (Mathwig/Mollenkopf 1996, p. 129). Because of
the great part of the constituency which is formed by the pensioners the major parties have
shown a protective attitude towards the pension system. When changes were made, they
were of gradual and incremental nature with only minor impact on the current pensions.
Thus, the West German pensioners represent a relatively satisfied group of the welfare
clientele.
Of only secondary importance is the engagement for the unemployed. Here, nearly one
fifth doubts the necessity of state responsibility at all. In terms of expenditure more then
the half plea for a status quo and 18 per cent for a reduction of unemployment
expenditure; 29 per cent for an increase. The unemployed themselves deviate significantly
from this overall picture. A majority of them regards the current benefit level as too low
and demands more spending. For the others, the current unemployment benefit level gives
little reason for further concern and even cutback proposals will find their political
supporters. It has been shown that that the willingness to accept cuts is greatest in the area
of unemployment benefits and lowest in the case of pensions with regard to the whole
spectrum of benefits (Roller1999, p. 27). This retreat is related to the high contributory
burden to which the employees and workers are exposed and which is the subject of
continuous criticisms and complains (see Föste/Janßen 1997, p. 225ff.). Hence, this
empirical finding might support the theses of an inherent ‘insider-outsider’ conflict of the
German system which copes only deficiently with the imbalances of the labour market.
It has to be noted that in contrast to Britain, which has experienced harsh retrenchment
measures throughout the 80s, the German welfare state has demonstrated an institutional
robustness due to constraints of the constitutional and institutional architecture. A New
Right was neither feasible, nor did the Conservative government envisage a radical break
with the welfare commitment. Although cost containment was a principal objective of the
Kohl government, the maintenance of corporative and consensus-oriented regulation was
not at disposal. Moreover, the Conservative government carefully avoided bold and radical
reforms which could endanger the electoral success; changes have occurred only on a
modest scale. The welfare state enjoyed popular esteem throughout these years, although
the demands for an expansive course of the welfare state have weakened since 1990 (see
Kaase/Newton 1998, p 50). Nonetheless, the people in the mid-90s were less satisfied with
the system of social security than in the years before, not at least because of its insecure
prospects (Bulmahn/Mau 1996).
Moreover, the West-German attitudes seem to be impregnated by a growing awareness
that a further expansion of the welfare state is neither likely, nor affordable. A majority of
nearly 70 per cent prefers cuts in taxes even if this means less spending for social services.
They come to realise that the future might bring about ‘less’ state welfare because of thebudget constraints and they are not willing to contribute with further tax increases.
Especially the upper and the middle classes put greater emphasis on a higher disposable
income rather than on costly welfare programs. The public discussions about high costs of
labour due to the insurance contributions might contribute to this attitudinal positioning.
Nonetheless, the fact that there is still a tendency to support higher expenditures for single
welfare state schemes suggests that this result does not represent general retreat from the
welfare state. Moreover, as Mishra (1984, p. 85) has pointed out, the contradiction in
popular attitudes of “‘having your cake and eating it too’ comes out clearly in the polls
where individuals support tax reductions and at the same time demand higher government
spending on major social services”.
Redistribution ranks not very high on the agenda of the West German public. There is
still a majority which complies with this governmental task, but only one quarter agrees
that the government should definitively reduce income differences and nearly 40 per cent
take a stance against. Obviously, the lower social classes and the groups outside the labour
market demand redistributive measures, whereas the higher status groups are more likely
to disagree. Nonetheless, this attitudinal differences have lesser significance than in
Britain. On the issue of redistribution the East-West differences are most apparent; the
East-Germans possess a highly ‘egalitarian ethos’ and expect from the state to correct
market inequalities. The dominant allocation principle and its outcomes are less legitimised
than in the Western part of the country. This empirical result can be explained by the port-
communist heritage and socialisation effects, but also as caused by the ‘impositions’ of the
present time. The East Germans were facing rapid and deep social changes which brought
about a much higher degree of inequality and insecurity to which they are not yet
habituated.
In this situation, many East-Germans expect from the state to intervene and to cushion
the impact of the social transformation. An overwhelming majority is in favour of higher
spending even in the face of rising taxes. The state, so it seems, is called into action. This
‘etatist orientation’ (see Liebig/Wegener 1995) is apparent in the social policy fields of
pensions, health and unemployment. In the first two areas hardly anybody denies the state
responsibility; in the unemployment sector only 8 percent would relieve the government
from this task. A similar and strong tendency for ‘more state’ is apparent in the spending
issue. Vast majorities are in favour of higher expenditure and express thereby their
dissatisfaction with the current level.
The unemployment benefit does not fall far behind as it is the case in Britain or West
Germany. On the contrary, 56 per cent or the East-Germany demand a higher degree of
governmental engagement for the unemployed. Roller (1999) reports, that cuts in
unemployment benefits are with social assistance and old age pensions the most unwanted
from all. This result is hardly surprising in the face of serious labour market problems; the
breakdown of the East-German economy destroyed 3,4 million jobs and created a crowd of
more than 1.1 million unemployed. Nearly half of the East-German partner households
have experienced unemployment from 1991 till 1994 (Berger/Schulz 1996). If we take into
account that unemployment was till then an unknown social phenomena, the attitudinalstance of the East-Germans can be taken as repercussion of a different socialisation, the
degree of being affected by unemployment and the course of the transformation process.
It goes without saying, that the East-Germans represent a ‘substratum’ of the German
society. Proportionally, the majority of the East Germans ascribe themselves to the lower
and the working class, whereas the West Germany has a clear middle class bias. This
inequality structure accounts for rather different attitudinal stances, whether in comparison
with the West German counterpart or if we look at the differentiation of attitudes.
Nonetheless, there is some group specificity and differentiation of the attitudinal stances
and the East Germans appear to be less homogeneous than in the first years after the
unification. It has been said (e.g. Liebig/Verwiebe 1999, p. 20), that the ‘winner’ of the
transformation might be the carrier of an emphatic 'market ideology’ because of their
successful entrance into the western model. According to the data a social differentiation of
attitudes exists, but remains in a confined corridor. The high income groups of the East-
German society deviate only marginal from the average of the population. Only in the case
of unemployment the attitudinal dispersal exceeds the West German situation, although the
highest quartile still demands proportionally more state engagement then the lowest
quartile in West Germany.
Not only on the level of objective measures such as income and employment, but also in
terms of mentalities and social orientations Germany is still a divided country.
Nonetheless, since the German unification the social differences have lessened and some
of the very strong etatist and egalitarian attitudes of the East Germans have weakened. It
would appear that the attitudinal gap is closely related to the differences in objective living
conditions and life chances. The standing of the welfare state is strongly affected by such
an attitudinal landscape. On the one hand, the unconditional absorption of the East German
population has seriously threatened the viability of many well entrenched welfare
principles and thereby created a legitimacy problem for the western social security
contributors
14, but on the other hand there was a strong reliance on social transfers in the
time of social upheaval in the East. This need for welfare state intervention is clearly
expressed in the attitudes. With a social spending that peaked around 70 per cent of the
East German GDP it seems evident that a socially acceptable transformation would not
have been possible without the welfare state engagement. Nonetheless, the two tier welfare
state continues, with large – and identifiable - sectors of the population dependent on the
welfare state while others in employment bear most of the financial burden. Since the
unification this feature has been extended by the highly political dimension of East and
West.
14 Mangen (1994, p. 56) states: “Large sectors of the population have felt understandably aggrieved that they
are paying more than their fair share of unification costs.”Conclusion
The picture provided shows a public that is generally in favour of the welfare state and
its institutions. The British social attitudes have resisted the ideological confrontation of
the anti-welfare ideology of the New Right. The beliefs about the proper role of the state
remained relatively robust even in the face of powerful attacks of the anti-collectivists.
Despite some fears that the public support might rapidly diminish once privatisation, lower
public standards and provision alternatives have been pushed through, the public has
remained committed to the heartland services. That they demand higher spending is, not at
least, a reaction towards retrenchment. Nonetheless, the redistributive and socially biased
measures are less entrenched within the liberal legacy. With regard to these issues, the
public support can not be taken for granted and seems to be vulnerable due to general
worries about the operation of the system in terms of free-riding, disincentives and
resource diversion.
The German model suffers from a substantial East-West divide in terms of welfare
dependency and welfare support. While the East Germans overwhelmingly demand and
approve welfare state intervention, is the West German public more reluctant to call for
further expansion. A ‘status quo mentality’ has become the dominant attitude of a saturated
and content majority, but there is also some signs for a readiness to accept cuts in benefits.
These are signs of a modest and sector-specific “demand flexibility” (Roller 1999, p. 37)
due to a growing realism about what the welfare state can afford. Notwithstanding, the
high support for the welfare state in the East makes substantial cuts politically costly and
limits the scope of welfare state reform. Politicians in their efforts to restructure the
welfare state have demonstrated a high degree of awareness of what the public is ready to
accept. If the drift towards the detachment of the beneficiaries from the middle masses of
contributors continues, some types of benefits, especially minority benefits, might be
prioritised when it comes to cost-containment measures. In this situation the self-interest of
the majorities might override their moral commitment.
A “culture of contentment” with its emphasis on self-regard and a government which
carefully avoids to threaten or to intrude the demands of a content majority, so the
economist Galbraith (1992), might not facilitate the best of all reforms. The protective
attitudes will hardly allow to promote urgently needed changes of the current system.
Instead, incremental changes might be the dominant feature of welfare state development
and simply re-enforce the existing regulatory mode. Examples for this are the productivist
re-ordering of social policy with contractual elements, welfare consumerism and an
individualisation of social entitlements. Against this, citizenship concepts with an emphasis
on inclusion, universality and accessibility can gain attractiveness and win political
support. The case of the British health system and the society-wide commitment towards it
is an apt example of it. Others, such as a guaranteed minimum income on a citizenship
bases have appealed to political fractions across party-borders. The question is, whether the
political actors are able to establish a transformative discourse about social policy issues
which serves to reframe the norms and interest-orientations of the electorate and help to
open up new arrays of societal integration.Bibliography
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Table 1:









Percent saying the government should definitively be
responsible for providing*
...providing health care for the sick
...providing a decent standard for living for the old
...providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed




























Percent agreeing and strongly agreeing that the
government should redistribute wealth***
54 49 76
Governments choice/ percentage agreeing
Reduce taxes even if this means spending
Less on social services
Or






Cuts in government spending
percentage strongly in favour and in favour****
45 85 82
*Categories: definitively, probably, probably not, definitively not
**Categories: much more, more, same as now, less, much less
***Categories: strongly agree, agree, neither nor, disagree, disagree strongly
****Categories: Strongly in favour, in favour, neither nor, against, strongly against.
Data: ISSP 1996.Table 2
























































































*Categories: much more, more, same as now, less, much less
Income as household-income per head, low income = lowest quartile, middle income = two middle quartiles,
high income as highest quartile (UK N=886, West Germany N=2361, East Germany N=872)
Economic status UK Unemployed N=40, Retired N=216, Employed N=506
West-Germany Unemployed N=95, Retired N=447, Employed N=1308
East-Germany Unemployed N=139, Retired N=294, Employed N=594
Data: ISSP 1996.Table 3





Percent agreeing and strongly agreeing that the




























Spending more on social services even if this



























Cuts in government spending



























*Categories: strongly agree, agree, neither nor, disagree, disagree strongly.
**Categories: Strongly in favour, in favour, neither nor, against, strongly against.
Income as household-income per head, low income = lowest quartile, middle income = two middle quartiles,
high income as highest quartile (UK N=886, West Germany N=2361, East Germany N=872)
Economic status UK Unemployed N=40, Retired N=216, Employed N=506
West-Germany Unemployed N=95, Retired N=447, Employed N=1308
East-Germany Unemployed N=139, Retired N=294, Employed N=594
Data: ISSP 1996.Logistic regression models of attitudinal determinants
The economic status has been recoded into separate dummy-variables:
Employed (Full-time and part-time) code 1, all other values 0
Unemployed code 1, all other values 0
Retired code 1, all other values 0
Income is the household income per head in quartiles (1 lowest, 4 highest quartile).
The dependent variable has been dichotomised:
Health, Retirement and Unemployment: mode and much more 1, else 0
Redistribution: strongly agree and agree 1, else 0
More social services 1, else 0
Cuts in spending: strongly in favour and in favour 1, else 0.
United Kingdom




Unemployed 5.993 -419 0.263* 0.124 0.205 0.183
Employed 0.213 -324 -0.569** 0.093 -0.538** 0.163
Retired 0.200 0.359 -0.504* -0.108 -0.034 0.617**
Income-quartiles -0.210 -157 -0.321** -0.364** 0.131 -0.174*
Constant 2.534** 1.718** 0.412* 0.884** 0.171 -0.064
Correct
predictions % 90 76 68 58 57 59
West Germany




Unemployed 0.185 0.281 1.044** 0.523* 0.484 0.266
Employed -0.125 -0.059 -0.059 0.161 0.104 0.319
Retired 0.216 0.453** 0.290 0.354* -0.237 0.524*
Income-quartiles -0.178** -0.317 -0.297** -0.220 0.046 0.207**
Constant 0.601** 0.458** -0.282 0.218 -1.217** 0.950**
Correct
predictions % 55 59 72 56 74 85
East Germany




Unemployed 0.669 1.020* 1.044** 0.500 0.325 0.568
Employed 0.119 0.276 0.213 0.300 0.230 0.446
Retired 0.805* 1.418** 0.792** 1.002** 0.261 0.510
Income-quartiles -0.112 -0.126 -0.417** -150* -0.087 0.065
Constant 0.763* 0.73 0.867** 0.905** -0.284 0.876**
Correct
predictions % 70 61 62 73 56 81
*significant at the 95% level, **significant at the 99 % level
Data: ISSP 1996.